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We  examined  children’s  judgments  of the  real/not-real  status  of
ﬁctional characters  given  that  such  judgments  can  be  based  either
on  the  ontological  status  of  the  character  or on the  authenticity  of a
representation  of the character.  Sixty  3 - 5 year-olds  and  20 adults
were  shown  paired  photographs  of ﬁctional  characters  (e.g.,  Bob
the Builder)  and  people  dressing  up as  those  characters  (e.g.,  a  per-
son wearing  a  Bob  the  Builder  costume).  They  were  asked  whether
each depicted  character  lives  in  ‘the  real  world’  (ontology  ques-
tion) and  whether  each  character  is ‘the  real’  ﬁctional  character
(authenticity question),  and  why.  As expected,  younger  children,
and to  some  extent  older  children,  made  more  accurate  authen-
ticity judgments  than  ontology  judgments  about  the characters,
whereas adults  made  accurate  judgments  in  reply  to  both  ques-
tions. Furthermore,  younger  children  did  not  differentiate  between
the two  questions  in  their  justiﬁcations,  unlike  the  older  children
and adults.  Implications  for the  development  of  children’s  ability  to
make  reality  judgments  about  ﬁctional  characters  are  discussed.
©  2014  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  Inc.  This  is an  open
access article  under  the  CC BY-NC-ND  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
1. Introduction
Young children learn that characters and events from novels, television programs, blockbuster
movies or computer games form an ontologically distinct category that we  label as not real
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(Harris, 2000; Skolnick & Bloom, 2006; Woolley, 1997). They come to realize, for example, that Harry
Potter  is not a real schoolboy and that Bob the Builder could not really come to mend our roof.
Improvement occurs at around the age of 4 years in children’s ability to categorize a range of
characters and events as real or fantastical (Boerger, 2011; Bunce & Harris, 2013; Carrick & Quas,
2006; Corriveau, Kim, Schwalen, & Harris, 2009; Harris, Brown, Marriott, Whittall, & Harmer, 1991;
Samuels & Taylor, 1994; Sharon & Woolley, 2004; Skolnick & Bloom, 2006; Tullos & Woolley, 2009;
Woolley & Cox, 2007; Woolley, Boerger, & Markman, 2004). For example, nearly two  thirds of 3-
year-olds in a study by Sayfan and Lagattuta (2008) incorrectly endorsed the existence of imaginary
creatures such as monsters and witches; this number dramatically reduced to just 6% of 5-year-olds.
Similarly, Sharon and Woolley (2004) reported that 3-year-olds failed to categorize systematically a
variety  of real entities (e.g., dinosaurs, clowns, a child) and ﬁctional characters (e.g., Santa Claus, a
monster, Superman) as real or pretend, whereas 4–5-year-olds were more systematic. The critical test
in  such studies usually involves asking children whether or not an entity is real or pretend, or asking
children to sort a variety of entities into containers that represent the categories real and pretend.
Although these ﬁndings are fairly consistent, they are limited in two ways. First, the category ‘ﬁc-
tional character’ is not homogenous. It includes characters that range from those whose actions are
impossible in the real world (e.g., Harry Potter) to those whose actions are possible (e.g., Bob the
Builder), and characters about whose status children are deliberately misled (e.g., Santa Claus) or
alternatively reassured (e.g., monsters under the bed) (Harris, 2012). In a study by Boerger (2011),
(83)% and 52% of 3–7-year-olds judged Santa Claus and fairies respectively as ‘real’, but witches were
only  judged as real 22% of the time. Similarly Bunce (2007) found that 80% of 3–4-year-olds catego-
rized Father Christmas as real but only 45% judged Bob the Builder and Winnie the Pooh as ‘real’. By
implication, even if children can, in principle, distinguish ﬁctional characters from real entities, they
may  not always apply that distinction.
A second issue is that the term ‘real’ is multifaceted. As a result, it is not always clear what children
mean when they judge something as real (Woolley, 1997; Woolley & Wellman, 1990). For example,
Woolley, Boerger, and Markman (2004) found that 66% of 3–5-year-olds judged a novel Halloween
character (the Candy Witch) to be real, but children also judged their teacher to be real. As a result,
the authors doubted that children meant the same thing when they judged that both were real.
Another way of making reality judgments is on the basis of authenticity, that is, whether something
or someone is genuinely what they appear to be, as opposed to an imitation or fake. In a study of
children’s everyday uses of the word ‘real’, Bunce and Harris (2008) found that 2–7-year-olds rarely
commented on the ontological status of ﬁctional characters, e.g., “Monsters aren’t real”, but often
made statements about the authenticity of representations of ﬁctional characters, e.g., “He’s not the
real  Father Christmas” and “I saw the real Darth Vader.” Among the 4–7-year-olds, uses of the word
‘real’  were substantially more common in relation to authenticity than ontological status (63% vs.
29%).  Therefore, a judgment about whether something is real or not could be made on the basis of
authenticity (Is X a real one?) or ontological status (Does X live in the real world?). For example, in the
study  by Woolley et al. (2004), it is possible that children thought they were being asked whether the
Candy  Witch was an authentic example of a witch in contrast to a person dressing up and pretending
to be a witch.
Several studies have shown that children can make accurate judgments on the basis of authenticity
by the age of 3 years (Bunce & Harris, 2008, 2013; Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1987; Harris, Kavanaugh,
& Meredith, 1994; Woolley & Wellman, 1990). For example, in a study by Moll and Tomasello (2012),
3-year-olds correctly distinguished ‘the real X’ from an object that ‘looks like X’, and in a study by
Harris et al. (1994), 2–3-year-olds afﬁrmed that the cotton wool being used in a pretense scenario to
represent milk was ‘pretend’ milk, not ‘real’ milk. Three-year-olds can also categorize appropriately
real entities and toys as ‘real’ or ‘not real’ on the basis of authenticity, although there is an improvement
between the ages of 3 and 4 years in children’s ability to make these judgments for people dressing
up (Bunce & Harris, 2013).
Taken  together, this evidence suggests that it is important to further examine children’s reality
judgments about ﬁctional characters to determine the basis for their judgments. This was  partly
achieved in a recent study by Bunce and Harris (2013), in which children were provided with a con-
text  in which to make the real/not-real judgment. In that study, ﬁctional characters were presented
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in a pair with a human, e.g., the ﬁctional character Bob the Builder was  paired with a real builder, in
an  attempt to emphasize the ontological nature of the judgment. Compared to a control condition in
which  ﬁctional characters were presented individually, the paired presentation increased children’s
judgments that humans are ‘real’ and ﬁctional characters are ‘not real’. However, the context only
improved older children’s judgments (mean age 4;11), not younger children’s (mean age 3;11). The
context  also did not increase the number of justiﬁcations given by older and younger children that
made  a reference to the ontological status of the ﬁctional character or human. Thus, the context was
only  partly successful in helping children to make a judgment on the basis of ontological status.
In  the present study, we considered another way to clarify the intended judgment about the
real/not-real status of ﬁctional characters. We  asked participants to make two different judgments
about four different characters. Instead of only an ontological status judgment, they were asked to
make  both an ontological status and an authenticity judgment. Children were presented with two
versions of a given character, e.g., a photograph of the cartoon television character Bob the Builder
and a photograph of a real person dressing up as Bob the Builder. For each of the two  versions of a
character, they were asked an ontology question, e.g., ‘Does this Bob the Builder live in the real world?’
and  also an authenticity question, e.g., ‘Is this the real Bob the Builder?’ They were also asked to justify
each  of these four judgments. Note that a correct answer to the ontology and authenticity questions
for a given version of a particular character requires that children alter their judgment depending on
the  question posed. Thus, the picture of Bob the Builder depicted someone who  does not live in the real
world  but it nonetheless depicted the authentic Bob the Builder. Conversely, the picture of a person
dressed up as Bob the Builder depicted someone who  lives in the real world but is not the authentic
Bob the Builder.
Following Bunce and Harris (2008, 2013), the ﬁrst hypothesis was  that older children and adults
would make signiﬁcantly more accurate ontology judgments than younger children. The second
hypothesis was that all participants would make accurate authenticity judgments. In other words, we
expected  younger children to make signiﬁcantly more accurate authenticity judgments than ontology
judgments but older children and adults to be equally accurate in making these two  judgments. Our
design  also enabled us to examine potential age changes in the frequency of justiﬁcations referring to
the  properties of the character (e.g., whether or not it was wearing the character’s authentic clothes)
versus the status of the character (e.g., whether it was  a television character).
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Forty younger children (M = 4;1, range 3;7 to 4;8), 20 older children (M = 5;3, range 4;10 to 5;10)
and 20 adults (M = 23 years, range 18;35 years) were tested. Equal numbers of males and females were
in  each age group. Children were recruited from preschools and schools in Oxfordshire and Berkshire,
UK,  and adults were undergraduates from Oxfordshire.
2.2. Stimuli and procedure
The  same procedure was used to test children and adults. Four well known ﬁctional characters (Bob
the  Builder, Fireman Sam, Postman Pat, Fiﬁ) were chosen from popular television shows for children
in  the UK. A pilot test on a sample of 10 children and 8 adults conﬁrmed that these characters were
familiar to them (i.e., ‘Do you recognize this character?’) and that they could assign the correct name
from  a choice of two names (e.g., ‘Is this Postman Pat or Postman Pete?’). Separate photographs of each
character, and a person dressing up as each character, were obtained from the internet. Each ﬁctional
character was paired with the person dressing up as the character, to produce 4 pairs (see Fig. 1 for
an  example of one pair).
The  ﬁrst pair of ﬁgures was introduced by the researcher saying: Look at these two [name of ﬁctional
character]s. The position of the ﬁctional character was  counterbalanced so that half the time it appeared
on  the left and half the time on the right. The researcher then pointed to one of the ﬁgures and asked
either the authenticity question: Is this the real [ﬁctional character]? or the ontology question: Does
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Fig. 1. Bob the Builder stimuli.
this [ﬁctional character] live in the real world? Each question was  a forced choice Yes/No question;
participants were not asked directly to compare the characters. After participants responded, they
were  asked to justify their response: Why  do you think he is/is not the real one? or Why  do you think
this  one lives/does not live in the real world? That pair of ﬁgures was  removed after the participant
answered just one question concerning one ﬁgure in the pair, and another pair was introduced. Each
pair  was presented 4 times (in a random order) so that the authenticity and ontology questions could
be  asked for each ﬁgure in the pair separately. This method was intended to increase the likelihood
that responses to each question and for each ﬁgure were independent of each other.
3. Results
3.1. Coding and preliminary analysis
Overall,  participants answered 8 authenticity and 8 ontology questions about 8 individual ﬁgures (4 ﬁctional characters and
4 persons dressing up as those characters). Each correct response to a given question, namely that the ﬁctional character but
not the person dressing up was the real one, or that the person dressing up but not the ﬁctional character lived in the real world,
achieved a score of 1. Preliminary analyses revealed no effect of gender of the participant or pair (builder, ﬁreman, postman,
gardener), therefore, these data were combined for further analysis.
3.2. Judgment accuracy
The  main analysis examined the effects of age, question (authenticity; ontology) and ﬁgure (ﬁctional character; person
dressing  up) on accuracy (range = 0–4). Fig. 2 shows that accuracy on the authenticity question was similarly high in each of
the three age groups, whereas accuracy on the ontology question improved with age. A 3 (age: 4;1-year-olds, 5;3-year-olds;
adults)  × 2 (Question: authenticity, ontology) × 2 (Figure: ﬁctional character; person dressing up) analysis of variance (ANOVA)
with repeated measures on the last two factors revealed no main effect of ﬁgure, F (1, 77) = .014, p = .908, but main effects of age,
F(2, 77) = 21.064, p < .001, 2 = .354, question, F(1, 77) = 6.730, p < .01, 2 = .180, and an interaction between age and question,
F(2,  77) = 8.006, p < .001, 2 = .172.
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Fig. 2. Mean number of correct judgments on the authenticity and ontology questions (max. 4) according to age and ﬁgure
(error bars represent standard errors).
To examine the interaction, pairwise comparisons were conducted to establish the effect of age for each question. These
conﬁrmed that there was no effect of age for the authenticity question (4-year-olds M = 3.21, SE = .18, 5-year-olds M = 3.03,
SE = .25, adults M = 3.48, SE = .25), but there was  an effect of age for the ontology question. Younger children (M = 1.51, SE = .21)
scored lower than older children (M = 2.55, SE = .30), p < .02, and both younger and older children scored lower than adults
(M = 3.85, SE = .30), ps < .01.
Analysis  of the simple effect of question within each age group revealed that younger children scored signiﬁcantly higher
on the authenticity question than on the ontology question, p < .001. Older children and adults, however, scored as highly on
the ontology question as the authenticity question.
In  summary, older children and adults made signiﬁcantly more accurate ontology judgments than younger children, sup-
porting the hypothesis that understanding that ﬁctional characters do not live in the real world develops substantially with age.
In addition, younger children made signiﬁcantly more accurate authenticity judgments than ontology judgments, supporting
the hypothesis that understanding authenticity is an earlier developmental achievement than understanding ontological status.
3.2.1. Ontology question error patterns
To  obtain a more detailed understanding of the age change in errors on the ontology question, we  divided errors into three
types with respect to a given character pair: (i) false positives (i.e., where children said that not only the person dressing up
but also the ﬁctional character lives in the real world); (ii) false negatives (i.e., where children said that not only the ﬁctional
character but also the person dressing up does not live in the real world); and (iii) double errors (i.e., where children said that
the ﬁctional character lives in the real world and the person dressing up does not live in the real world). Table 1 shows the
mean number of errors of each type made by participants in each age group. Inspection of Table 1 shows that all error types
generally decreased with age, but that double errors were the most frequent type of error produced by both groups of children,
especially younger children. Note that a double error on the ontology question reﬂects an answer pattern that would be doubly
correct for an authenticity question. We return to this point in the Discussion.
Table 1
Mean number of errors of each type in each age group (standard errors in brackets).
Error type
False positive False negative Double error
Age
4;1-years .83 (1.31) .20 (.41) 1.98 (1.75)
5;3-years .30 (.98) .40 (.68) 1.10 (1.59)
Adults .15 (.67) .05 (.22) .05 (.22)
Total  .53 (1.14) .21 (.47) 1.28 (1.66)
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3.2.2. Judgment accuracy of individuals
Judgment  accuracy was examined by comparing individual participants’ responses to chance. A score of ≥7/8 was
determined  as a signiﬁcant pass rate according to the binomial distribution, t(7) = 3.00, p < .02, assuming a 50% probability
of  being accurate by chance. For the authenticity question, similar proportions of participants in each age group scored
above chance: 67% (27) of 4;1-year-olds, 60% (12) of 5;3-year-olds, and 70% (14) of adults, 2(2, 80) = 0.752, ns. For the
ontology question, the proportion of participants who  scored above chance increased substantially with age: 15% (6)
of 4;1-year-olds, 45% (9) of 5;3-year-olds, and 95% (19) of adults, 2(2, 80) = 34.987, p < .001. These data support the
analysis  of the mean scores by showing that younger children make signiﬁcantly fewer accurate ontology judgments than
older children and adults and that younger children make more accurate authenticity judgments than ontological status
judgments.
3.3. Justiﬁcation analysis
Justiﬁcations were assigned to one of three categories: Properties, Status, or Uninformative. Property justiﬁcations referred
to the genuine or fake nature of a property of the ﬁgure, e.g., He has the proper tools; She has the right hair; He has the Fireman Sam
hat on; He’s got fake glasses; He’s just dressing up. Status justiﬁcations referred to the status of the ﬁgure or the location/medium
in  which the ﬁgure exists, e.g., He’s a cartoon character; It’s a human being; It’s a TV character so he lives on TV; He exists just
on TV, not in the world; He’s a boy and not in Fireman Sam’s world; It’s a real person that lives in this world; He lives in the real
country where everyone else lives. Uninformative justiﬁcations referred to perceptual features, e.g., He’s wearing a hat, or He’s got
a hammer but also included responses such as Don’t know and Because he is. All three types of justiﬁcations were produced in
response to both authenticity and ontology questions. The ﬁrst author coded all justiﬁcations and a second coder, blind to the
hypotheses, separately coded 50% of the justiﬁcations. Agreement was 93% (Cohen’s  = .89) and disagreements were resolved
through discussion. The mean number of property and status justiﬁcations are shown in Fig. 3a and b as a function of age,
question and ﬁgure.
3.3.1.  Property justiﬁcations
Inspection of Fig. 3a suggests that property justiﬁcations declined in frequency with age. In addition, whereas younger
children often produced property justiﬁcations for both questions, older children and adults provided more property justiﬁ-
cations in response to the authenticity question than the ontology question. A 3 (Age) × 2 (Question) × 2 (Figure) ANOVA on
the number of authenticity justiﬁcations, with repeated measures on the last two factors, was  conducted. This revealed a main
effect of ﬁgure, F(1, 77) = 10.287, p < .002, 2 = .118: More property justiﬁcations were produced for people dressing up (M = 1.36,
SE = .12) than ﬁctional characters (M = 1.08, SE = .13). There were also main effects of age, F(2, 77) = 13.127, p < .001, 2 = .254,
and question, F(1, 77) = 16.841, p < .001, 2 = .179, as well as an interaction between age and question, F(2, 77) = 6.481, p < .003,
2 = .144.
To  examine the interaction, pairwise comparisons between question for each age group conﬁrmed that younger children
produced a similar number of property justiﬁcations in response to the authenticity question (M = 1.83, SE = .19) and ontology
question (M = 1.88, SE = .18), ns. In contrast, older children produced signiﬁcantly more property justiﬁcations in response to
the authenticity question (M = 1.85, SE = .26) than the ontology question (M = 90, SE = .25), p < .001, as did adults (authenticity
question  M = .80, SE = .26; ontology question M = .08, SE = .25), p < .005.
Further exploration of the effect of age within each question revealed an effect of age for the authenticity question, p < .005.
Younger children produced as many property justiﬁcations as older children, and both groups produced more than adults,
ps < .01. There was also an effect of age for the ontology question, p < .001. Younger children produced signiﬁcantly more property
justiﬁcations than both older children and adults, ps < .007, but there was no difference between the number produced by older
children and adults.
In  sum, among older children and adults the authenticity question prompted more property justiﬁcations than did the
ontology question but this difference did not emerge for the younger children. In addition, younger children produced
more  property justiﬁcations than older children and adults with this age change being especially marked for the ontology
question.
3.3.2.  Status justiﬁcations
Inspection of Fig. 3b shows that status justiﬁcations increased in frequency with age. In addition, whereas younger children
produced few status justiﬁcations for either question, older children and adults provided more status justiﬁcations in response
to the ontology question than the authenticity question. A 3 (Age) × 2 (Question) × 2 (Figure) ANOVA on the number of status
justiﬁcations,  with repeated measures on the last two  factors, revealed a main effect of ﬁgure, F(1, 77) = 11.505, p < .001, 2 = .13:
More status justiﬁcations were produced for ﬁctional characters (M = 1.99, SE = .12) than people dressing up (M = 1.70, SE = .10).
There were also effects of age, F(2, 77) = 52.384, p < .001, 2 = .58, and question, F(1, 77) = 22.136, p < .001, 2 = .22, as well as an
interaction between age and question, F(2, 77) = 12.571, p < .001, 2 = .25.
To  examine the interaction, pairwise comparisons were conducted to establish the effect of question for each age
group.  These conﬁrmed that younger children produced a similar number of status justiﬁcations in response to the
authenticity (M = .88, SE = .17) and ontology questions (M = .71, SE = .16), ns. In contrast, older children produced signiﬁ-
cantly  more status justiﬁcations in response to the ontology question (M = 1.90, SE = .22) than the authenticity question
(M  = 1.20, SE = .23), p < .007, as did adults (ontology question M = 3.85, SE = .22, authenticity question M = 2.53, SE = .23),
p  < .001.
Further exploration of the effect of age within each question revealed an effect of age for the authenticity question, p < .001.
Both younger children and older children produced fewer status justiﬁcations than adults, ps < .001, but there was no difference
116 L. Bunce, P.L. Harris / Cognitive Development 32 (2014) 110–119
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
a
b
Authencity
queson
Ontology
queson
Authencity
queson
Ontology
queson
Authencity
queson
Ontology
queson
4;1-yrs 5;3-yrs Adults
People
dressing up
Ficonal
Charact ers
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
Authencity
queson
Ontology
queson
Authencity
queson
Ontology
queson
Authencity
 queson
Ontology
queson
4;1-yrs 5;3-yrs Adults
People
dress ing up
Ficonal
Charact ers
Fig. 3. (a) Mean number of property justiﬁcations according to age, question, and ﬁgure (error bars represent standard errors).
(b) Mean number of status justiﬁcations according to age, question, and ﬁgure (error bars represent standard errors).
between the number of status justiﬁcations produced by younger and older children. An effect of age also emerged for the
ontology question, p < .001. Pairwise comparisons revealed that younger children produced fewer status justiﬁcations than
older children, p < .001, and both groups of children produced fewer than adults, ps < .001.
In  sum, among older children and adults the ontology question prompted more status justiﬁcations than did the authenticity
question. In addition, younger children produced fewer status justiﬁcations than older children and adults; this age change was
especially marked for the ontology question.
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3.4. Effect of judgment accuracy on justiﬁcation
Finally, the relationship between judgments and justiﬁcations was explored for each question to establish whether correct
judgments were followed by an informative justiﬁcation (i.e., either a property or a status justiﬁcation) more often than incor-
rect judgments. Participants were assigned to one of four categories based on whether they performed above chance on the
judgments (≥7/8) and whether they produced 7 or more informative justiﬁcations.
A chi square test on the relationship between judgments and justiﬁcations for the authenticity question was  signiﬁcant,
2(1,N = 80) = 9.748, p < .002,  = .344. Of those who did not perform above chance on the judgment task (n = 27), the majority
(74%,  n = 20) also failed to produce 7 or more informative justiﬁcations. Of those who performed signiﬁcantly above chance on
the judgment task (n = 53), the majority also produced 7 or more informative justiﬁcations (62%, n = 33).
This relationship for the ontology question was  also signiﬁcant, 2(1,N = 80) = 14.034, p < .001,  = .41. Of those who did not
perform above chance on the judgment task (n = 46), the majority (54%, n = 25) also failed to produce 7 or more informative
justiﬁcations.  Of those who performed signiﬁcantly above chance (n = 34), the majority also produced 7 or more informative
justiﬁcations  (85%, n = 29).
4. Discussion
The current study examined children’s judgments of the real/not-real status of ﬁctional televi-
sion characters such as Bob the Builder and Fireman Sam. Children were presented with photographs
of ﬁctional characters paired with people dressing up as those characters. They were then asked to
make  two judgments: whether each ﬁgure lives in ‘the real world’ (ontology question) and whether
each ﬁgure is ‘the real’ ﬁctional character (authenticity question). Previous studies have tended to
pose  children a single, unadorned question about whether such characters are ‘real’. This, however,
may  be misleading because children might construe the question as a question about the character’s
ﬁctional status or as a question about the authenticity of a particular representation of the charac-
ter. For example, children who claim that a Santa Claus character is not real might do so because
it is evident that he is an ordinary man  dressing up and not because they disbelieve in the exis-
tence of Santa Claus. The method used in the current study was intended to clarify what was being
asked and to provide a clearer assessment of children’s understanding of the real/unreal nature of
ﬁctional characters. In line with our ﬁrst hypothesis, there was  no effect of age on accuracy for the
authenticity question. In other words, younger children, older children, and adults all made accurate
authenticity judgments to the same extent. In contrast, younger children made signiﬁcantly fewer
correct ontology judgments than older children, and older children made signiﬁcantly fewer correct
ontology judgments than adults. Our second hypothesis was  also supported: younger children (but
not  older children or adults) made signiﬁcantly more accurate authenticity judgments than ontology
judgments. Inspection of the pattern of errors for the ontology question further pinpointed children’s
difﬁculty in making ontology judgments. The most common error made by both groups of children,
and  especially younger children, was to judge that the ﬁctional character lives in the real world but
the  person dressing up does not live in the real world. This type of double error reﬂects an answer
pattern that would be correct for an authenticity question. A plausible interpretation, therefore, is
that,  children, especially younger children, may  have been prone to treat the ontology question as an
authenticity question.
The  justiﬁcations that participants produced provided further support for this interpretation.
Younger children produced an equal number of property justiﬁcations in response to the authen-
ticity and ontology question, suggesting that they did not treat the ontology question differently from
the  authenticity question. In addition, they produced very few status justiﬁcations. In contrast, older
children, and to a greater extent adults, produced more property justiﬁcations than status justiﬁca-
tions for the authenticity question, and more status justiﬁcations than authenticity justiﬁcations for
the  ontology question.
Together,  these ﬁndings suggest that it may  be misleading to assess children’s understanding of the
ontological status of ﬁctional characters by asking them to make a yes–no judgment about whether or
not  the character is real. This is because children might answer such a question in relation to ontological
status or authenticity. Our asking children to make both types of judgment revealed that the younger
children made accurate authenticity judgments about whether a ﬁgure was  the real ﬁctional character.
However, fewer than half of the younger and older children performed above chance when making
an  ontological judgment about whether or not the ﬁgure lives in the real world.
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Our method has the limitation that children were asked to make explicit verbal judgments about
whether the ﬁgures were real. A more nuanced assessment of children’s understanding of the dis-
tinction between humans and fantasy characters may  be obtained when they are probed indirectly
via questions about the properties of the characters rather than their ontological status. In studies
by  Boerger (2011), Sharon and Woolley (2004), and Shtulman (2008), preschoolers demonstrated
some understanding of the difference between fantasy characters and humans in their attribution of
properties.  For example, in Boerger (2011), 3–5-year-olds attributed more unusual abilities to fantasy
characters than people across biological, psychological, physical and social domains, although their
differentiation was far from complete.
The extent to which children understood that ﬁctional characters do not live in the real world
was somewhat less than other recent studies have found. In studies by Corriveau et al. (2009) and
Corriveau, Chen, and Harris (in press), 5–7-year olds were very accurate categorizing familiar real
(historical) and ﬁctional characters as real and pretend respectively; indeed, overall 3–4-year-olds
performed better than chance (Corriveau et al., 2009; Corriveau & Harris, in press). A possible expla-
nation for these ﬁndings is that children were asked to assign each character to a ‘real’ box or a
‘pretend’ box. By contrast, in the present study children were asked to give a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response
to each question. Thus, it is possible that children in our study were incorrect due to a ‘yes’ or ‘no’
response bias (Fritzley & Lee, 2003). This, however, seems unlikely. Either type of response bias would
have  meant that children would be mostly correct for one member of a pair and mostly incorrect for
the  other but, as noted earlier, this pattern did not emerge. In making their judgments about members
of  a pair of characters, children tended to score similarly across members of the pair, and the most
common error pattern (double error) meant that they responded yes to one question and no to the
other.
Children in our study were questioned about a speciﬁc type of ﬁctional character – cartoon char-
acters. Although children are likely to encounter these characters via a range of media (on television,
in  a book, as a toy, in a computer game) there was  more homogeneity among the characters in terms
of  their properties in the present study than in previous studies. Past research has asked children
about a range of fantasy characters – from monsters to Santa Claus. The cartoon characters we used
could be described as being more realistic; for example, Bob the Builder is a builder and Fireman Sam
extinguishes ﬁres. In principle, this might have increased the extent to which children incorrectly
judged the characters as living in the real world. However, inaccurate ontology judgments were rarely
followed  by status justiﬁcations. For example, having judged Bob the Builder to live ‘in the real world’
children did not justify that judgment by saying that he is ‘on T.V.’ By implication, children were not
drawing on a potentially useful type of evidence (that they had seen the character on television) but
then  coming to the wrong conclusion on the basis of that evidence. Instead they were often unable
to  provide a status justiﬁcation. A more likely possibility is that children’s performance reﬂects their
difﬁculty in differentiating among the various characters that they primarily encounter on television.
Television can depict both real events involving real people as well as ﬁctional events involving ﬁc-
tional  characters. In time, the experience of watching television may  enable children to make sense
of  the variety of characters that they see and eventually develop an understanding that any individ-
ual  character on television may  or may  not correspond to a person in the real world (Troseth, 2010;
Wright, Huston, Reitz, & Piemyat, 1994).
In sum, this study supports the hypotheses that young preschoolers can make accurate authentic-
ity judgments about ﬁctional characters, whereas an understanding of ontological status continues
to  develop beyond the preschool years. Preschoolers competently distinguished between the real,
authentic representation of a ﬁctional character and a person dressing up, pretending to be that
character. However, they had difﬁculty with the concept of ontological status: Only 15% performed
above chance, and the most common error type was to say that the ﬁctional character lived in the
real  world but that the person dressing up did not live in the real world. This response pattern was
consistent with correct performance on the authenticity question, i.e., to afﬁrm that the ﬁctional
character was the real one and that the person dressing up was  not. In addition, the younger children
did  not differentiate between the two questions in their pattern of justiﬁcations: they largely
produced property justiﬁcations to both questions and produced very few status justiﬁcations. These
data  support the conclusion that the younger children may  have been prone to treat the ontology
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question as an authenticity question, perhaps because they did not understand the ontology question
or  because they do not readily consider ontological status.
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